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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a contract action wherein olaintiff 
ordered certain electrical heaters from defendant 3rown 
who in turn ordered heaters from defendant Val ad. The 
heaters were later claimed to be defective. 
DISPOSITION ON MAIN APPEAL 
This case was tried by the lower court on 
January 19, 1976, throuqh January 29, 1976, the Honorable 
Hal Taylor, District Judge, presidinq. The matter was 
appealed after an adverse ruling to defendant Valad. 
1'his court upheld the lower court's decision in an ooin-
ion filed on March 6, 1980. 1'hat r'lecision was founoed 
entirely upon considerations of in personam jurisdiction 
over a non-resident. 
A petition for rehearina was filed on March 21, 
1980, with an extension to file this brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING 
Defendant Valad stronaly contends that this 
court neqlected the principles and holdinq set forth in 
World-Wide Volkswaaen Corp. v. Woodson, U.S. , 100 S. 
Ct. 6 2 L. F.d • 2 d 4 9 0 ( 19 8 0 ) • Defendant Valad also 
contends that this court failed to consider at least two 
material points in the case dealinq with contract forma-
tion and measure of damages. 'C'his court should rehear 
its decision on the main appeal, and reverse the lower 
court, or remand for entry of the correct measure of 
damages. 
- ii -
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 6, 1980, this court filed a decision 
in this cause, holding that defenClant Val ad was subiect 
to in personam jurisdiction under the Utah long-arm stat-
ute. On March 21, 1980, defendant Valad filed a petition 
for a rehearinq and secured an ex parte extension of time 
in which to file the brief in support of that petition. 
All of the points set forth in the petition 
have been raised previously. 
U. 518, 231 P. 832 (1924). 
Berq v. Otis Elevator, 64 
Valad made seven points in its brief on apoeal, 
and three points in its reply brief. However, it would 
appear that only the point dealing with personal juris-
diction and the long-arm statute was considered by the 
court in the original hearinq., Rehearinq is :iustified 
because this court failed to consider certain important 
points with respect to Valad's arquments on the theory of 
damages and the application of the elements of contract 
law, and therefore erred in its conclusion. Additional-
ly, the court based its decision with respect to lonq-arm 
iurisdiction on some erroneous principles of law in light 
of the United States Supreme Court decision in World-Wide 
Volkswaqen Corp. v. Woodson, supra. 
Therefore, on rehearing this court should re-
verse its decision with respect to the findinqs of lia-
- 1 -
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bility aqainst Valad under the lonq-arm statute or reduce 
the damaqes in this case to comport with the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code and the standard measure of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT'S HOLDING ON JURISDICTION 
IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
LIGHT OF THE RECENT U. S. SUPREME COURT 
CASE OF WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V. 
WOODSON. THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED 
THE FACT THAT VALAD'S ACTIVITIES CON-
STITUTED AN ISOLATED OCCURRENCE. 
The Mallory Test 
In the main decision, this court seemed to find 
1urisdiction over Valad on the basis of the alleqed facts 
that the heating units were required by Brown and Mallory 
to meet certain specified reauirements " ... which involved 
modifications by Valad of its basic cataloq models." 
Mallory v. Brown, No. 15530, P. 6 (March 6, 1980). Ac-
cordinq to the opinion, Valad was "contractinq to supply 
qoods in the state of Utah ... by its modification of qen-
eral heating models and their shipment to Utah ... " Valad, 
the Court reasoned, purposely availed itself of the 
privilege of conductinq activities in the forum state of 
Utah, thus invoking the benefits and orotection of its 
laws. This act supplied the requisite minimum factual 
nexus or "minimum contacts", according to the court's 
- 2 -
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opinion. Id. at 7. 
'1'he second part of the test applied by this 
court examined whether it is reasonable and fair to re-
quire Valad to conduct its defense in this state, based 
upon an analysis of the quality and nature of its activi-
ties. If the leqal dispute arises out of, or has a sub-
stantial connection with, the activity in the state (i.e. 
modifyinq the heaters for a Utah customer), the court 
need only look at the convenience of the parties and the 
interest of the state in assumino iurisdiction. Id. 
The World-Wide Test 
This test as set forth in Mallory, and espe-
cially as applied to Valad, flies in the face of the 
leqal principles established in World-Wide, supra. In 
that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state can-
not exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident c1efendant 
unless there are sufficient "minimum contacts" between 
the defendant and the forum state. International Shoe 
Co. v. Washinqton, 326 U.S. 310, at 316, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 
s. Ct. 154, 161 ALR 1057 (1945). "Minimum contacts" are 
required to protect a defendant aqainst the burdens of 
1 i tigating in an inconvenient forum and to "insure that 
the states, through their courts, do not reach out beyond 
the 1 imi ts imposed on them by their status as co-equal 
sovereions in a federal system." World-Wide at 498. The 
- 3 -
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Worl<'l-Wide court specifically held that there are not 
sufficient minimuJT1 contacts where there is a scant or 
fortuitous connection between the defendant and the forum 
state, or if the relationship between the defendant and 
the forum state is that of an "isolated occurrence". Id. 
at 501. With respect to an isolated occurrence, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated: 
... if the sale of a oroduct of a man-
ufacturer or distributor ... is not 
simply an isolated occurrence, but 
arises from the efforts of the manu-
facturer or d1str1butor to serve-,~­
d1rectly or indirectly, the market 
for its oroduct in other States, it 
is not unreasonable to subiect it to 
suit in one of thosA States .... The 
forum State does not exceed its 
powers under the Due Process Clause 
if it asserts personal jurisdiction 
over a corpor.ation that delivers its 
products into the stream of commerce 
with the exoectation that they will 
be purchased by consumers in the 
forum State. (Emphasis adde<'l) World-
wide at 501-2. 
The decision in this cause unfairly says that 
Utah may reach out its "lonq-arm" beyond the limits im-
posed by the federal system. It completely ianores the 
isolated nature of this transaction. It disregards the 
facts of the case, which clearly show that Valad was it-
self solicited in New York, and did not solicit the con-
tract in Utah. Reversal on rehearing is iustified since 
the Due Process Clause "does not comtemplate that a state 
- 4 -
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may make binding a judgment in personam against an indi-
u idual or corporate defendant with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations". (emphasis added) Interna-
tional Shoe at 319, as cited in World-Wide at 499. 
The Contacts Were In New York 
All of the significant "contacts" in this case 
were in New York; consequently, a judgment aaainst Valad 
strikes at due process under the federal system. 
This contract resulted from the efforts of Ted R. Rrown, 
(hereinafter "Brown") 
lory. (T. 407: see 
not Valad, to supply qoods to Mal-
Brief of Valad, ops. 15-18). 't'he 
early contacts in this matter, unsolicited by Valad, were 
made in April, 1972 by telephone to Valad in New York. 
The evidence is undisputed that at no time did Valad ever 
have any offices, sales representatives, traveling sales-
men, a telephone number, any direct advertising, or any 
other similar "contacts" in the state of Utah. ( 't'. 360: 
R. 4-5). There simply was no effort of Valad to "serve 
directly or indirectly" the market for the state of Utah. 
Valad did nothing more than pick the phone up and answer 
the calls when Brown's representatives dialed from Utah. 
Valad was solicited; it was not the solicitor. 
It is true that Brown askec'l Valad to moc'lify 
some of its heaters for sale to Brown. However, the mod-
- 5 -
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ifications were to take place in New York, pursuant to 
Brown's specifications sent to New York. Where, then, is 
the purposeful availing of the privileoes and benefits of 
the law in the state of Utah necessary to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction? 
The final acceptance of the offer to manufac-
ture these heaters came in New York when Valad received 
the final drawings from Brown and accepted them in bind-
ing contract fashion by beoinninq manufacture in Mew 
York. '1'hese drawings were approved by Mallory and Brown. 
'1'hese points were undisputed at trial and there is no 
evidence to the contrary. (See main brief, pp. 44-47). 
The Mallory decision, at p. 7, finds that the 
modification in New York of the general heatino mo<'lels 
and their shipment to Utah constituted a purposeful 
availinq by Val ad of the privileges and benefits of the 
forum state (Utah). But it is actually quite the con-
trary, because all of the modifications and actions with 
respect thereto took place in New York, and not in Utah. 
Instructions on manufacture were directed to Valad by 
telephone and mail in New York. There was no purposeful, 
direct or indirect development of the market in Utah. 
'1'his court's test as developed in Mallory mioht be valid 
if Valad were manufacturing products and puttino them in-
to the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
- 6 -
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would end up in Utah. However, it was Valad's undisputed 
testimony that these particular heaters were aPProved for 
construction by Mallory and Brown and were desiqned pur-
suant to that approval by Valad in New York. (T. 411-12; 
429-30; 451-53; Exs 20, B3; main brief pps. 19, 23) 
Under those circumstances, it is difficult to see "that 
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum 
state are such that he should reasonably anticipate beina 
haled into court there." World-Wide at 501. 
111allory Conflicts With World-Wide 
The Mallory test of "whether the cause of 
action arises out of or has a substantial connection with 
the activity" is overly expansive and thus will violate 
due process, the federal system and the limitations of 
World-Wide in many instances. This is partly because 
Mallory completely ianores the elements of "reasonable 
anticipation" and "isolated occurrence". Under 1-lallory, 
it is difficult to imaqine any cause of action that could 
not be said to "arise out of (or have) a substantial con-
nection with the activity" (Mallory, p. 7) reqardless of 
whether or not the activity is isolated. The r-eason i., 
-imple: "activity" is very broadly ilefined and in this 
case, includes "modification of qeneral heatina models 
(note: in New York) and their shipment to Utah." (com-
- 7 -
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ments added) ~· Under that standard, no matter how iso-
lated the manufacture of these modifier'! heaters may be, 
no matter how unanticipated a "haling" into Utah courts 
may be, there will always be a substantial connection 
between the action filed and the suspect activity (modi-
fication of heaters). Mallorv is, in effect, a statement 
that any manufacturer of a chattel who sells and ships 
the same into Utah is subject to the jurisdiction of Utah 
courts ( assuminq that the balancinq of the convenience 
test is also met), because the manufacturer has purposely 
availed himself of privileoes ana benefits of Utah law, 
estahlishino the minimum factual nexus. 'T'hereafter, the 
alleoed damage would always arise out of or have a sub-
stantial connection with the activity of shipping the 
modified chattel. However, in World-Wide, the court con-
demned this philosophy, sayinq that: 
Bvery seller of chattels would in 
effect (be) appoint(ino) the chattel 
his agent for service of process. 
His (the seller's) amenability to 
suit would travel with the chattel. 
World-Wide at 501. (Parentheticals 
and emphasis added) 
Isolated Transaction 
The isolated nature of this transaction (T. 
360) is further shown by the undisputed fact that Valad 
refused to come to Utah in early May at Mallory's urqino 
- 8 -
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to supposedly rectify the situation. Valad felt that it 
had no contacts in Utah and was under no obliqation in 
Utah. Al though the whole transaction had taken place 
throuqh the mails and over the telephone, oerformance had 
occurred in New York. The only contact with Utah was the 
isolated act of interstate shipping. This was Valad's 
only Utah transaction. (T. 360) There was no regular or 
systematic shipping into Utah. World- Wide at p. 502. 
This court is taking the oosi tion that Val ad 
purposely availe<'l itself of the orivileqes an<'l benefits 
of Utah law by agreeing to manufacture in New York some 
heaters which were designed in New York pursuant to spec-
ifications sent by Brown to New York, where Valad had no 
agents or salesmen soliciting in Utah. Its advertise-
ments of its products were placed in trade journals and 
not designed or intended to specifically solicit in Utah 
but on the contrary, implicitly invited inauiries in New 
York. (Bxs. 42-45). 
In this context, the due ~rocess auestion must 
be addressed by this court: Who should bear the litiqa-
tion risk of doing interstate business under these cir-
cumstances? Should Valad bear the risk when it was soli-
cited in New York to build specialized heaters in New 
- 9 -
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York, when the solicitors (Brown and Mallory) had fore-
knowledqe that Valad would test the heaters in New York, 
not in situ in Utah?* ~hy should Valad assume this risk 
when all it did was pick up the phone and respond to in-
ouiries? The entire ranqe of the responses of Valad 
emanated from New York and were conceived in New York. 
It directed only mail and telephonic correspondence to 
Utah before usinq the mails to ship the final pro<iuct. 
F.:i ther Mallory or Brown could have insiste<i as part of 
the contract that Valad come to Utah, "spec out" the 
~nvironmental chambers, and oerform certain tasks in Utah 
to insure proper operation. They chose not to no this, 
but to direct and complete actions in New York. Mallory 
and Brown should therefore take the litiqation risk in 
this context of an isolated transaction. 
Recommended Approach 
It is suqqested that the proper "minimum con-
tacts" test in Utah should embrace the followinq steps: 
1. The factual question must be asked as to 
who solicits or initiates the contact. 
* The testimony at trial was undisputed that 
Valad did not know where or how the heaters were to be 
used, in any specific manner, except that they would be 
placed in some vaquely defined "environmental chamber." 
The speci fie details of their use were known only to 
Mallory and Brown. (T. 6-7: 10, 13: main brief, pps. 
11-17). 
- 10 -
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2. If a business not otherwise involved in 
Utah is solicited to perform some unique task in another 
state, such as modifyinq heaters in New York, the solici-
tor should ordinarily take the risk associated with the 
transaction. 
3. Jurisdiction for breach of contract in this 
type of case should be in the foreiqn jurisdiction unless 
the nature of the non-resident's business and contacts 
are such that he would normally do enouqh business in 
Utah to expect to be haled into court here. 
process. 
This suqqested approach complies with due 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $30,840.60 
AS OVERHEAD OR "INDIRECT COSTS OR 
DAMAGES" AGAINST VALAD IS WITHOUT PRE-
CEDENCE OR JUSTIFICATION. THIS COURT 
MUST HAVE FAILED TO CONSIDER THIS 
POINT AND SHOULD AT LEAST RULE ON THE 
MATTER. 
The lower court awarded Sl0,647."80 as direct 
costs and damaqes sustained by the plaintiff, of which 
approximately $8,072 represented "cover" and the balance, 
incidental and consequential damaqes. However, damaqes 
in this entire transaction are qoverned by the Utah Uni-
form Commercial Code, U.C.A., 1953, §§70A-2-711 and 712. 
Assuminq that Mallory is entitled to prevail, thes~ dama-
qes are justifiable. 
- 11 -
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However, the lower court's award of overhead or 
"indirect costs or damaoes" in the amount of S30,840.fi0 
is totally without precedent in law or equity and very 
unjust. 
The main decision in this case does not even 
treat the issue of damages. This would not be so bad if 
the issue were simply that of a proverbial "cat fiqht" 
between the parties as to what the evidence showed as to 
the amount of damages. However, the matter is far more 
serious in that the lower court is, by its award of over-
head damages, stakino out an entirely new theory of law 
as it pertains to damaoes. 
If this court wishes to fundamentally change 
the law in the state of Utah as to the measure of dam-
ages, it may probably do so. Valad has some doubt that 
this court really so intended. This court should, how-
ever, at least address the issue in a written opinion, 
showing precisely why and under what standards such a 
novelty will hereafter be employed, if such was intended. 
Otherwise, there should be a remittitur on damages. 
The strongest evidence that Mallory could pro-
duce at trial as to a reason for awarding overhead dam-
aqes is that its accounting procedure figured overhead as 
a part of the cost of every iob. However, a company's 
internal accountino procedure is hardly reason enouoh to 
- 12 -
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stake out radically new territory in the area of damaqes. 
The court should reduce damaqes to Sl0,647.80. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT FAILF.D TO CONSIDER AND 
REACH A DECISION ON A FUNDAMENTAL 
ISSUE OF THIS CASE REGARDING CONTRACT 
FORMATION AS SET FORTH IN POINTS II, 
IV, V, AND VI OF VALAD'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL. THE LOWER COURT NEVER MADE A 
SPECIFIC FINDING ON CONTRACT FORMA~ION 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE COMPELLED A FINDING 
OF A CONTRACT WHICH VALAD FULFILLED 
ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS: OR IF UNFUL-
FILLED, THAT IT WAS SOLELY DUE TO THE 
FAULT OF BROWN AND MALLORY. 
In this case, Valad made a written offer to 
Mallory and Rrown. Brown, in turn, sliqhtly modified 
that written offer so that it became a counter offer and 
sent it to Va1ad in New York. Valad accepted the counter 
offer in New York without any chanqe or proposed modifi-
cation. As the American Law Institute stated in Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts, §228: 
An aqreement is inteqrated when the 
parties thereto adopt a writinq or 
writinqs as the final and complete 
expression of the aqreement. An inte-
gration is the writinq or writinqs so 
adopted. * * * It is an essential of 
an inteqration that the parties shall 
have manifested assent not merely to 
the provisions of their aqreement but 
also to the writing or writings in 
question as a final statement of their 
intentions as to the matters therein 
contained. 
Also, in the American Law Institute's Comment 
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on §230 of the Restatement, these statements appear: 
Where, however, they inteorate their 
aqreement, they have attempted more 
than to assent by means of symbols to 
certain thinqs. They have assented to 
the writinq as the expression of the 
things to which they agree, therefore 
the terms of the writing are conclusive 
and the contract may have a meaninq 
different than that which each party 
supposed it to have. 
The applicable law of the State of New York 
coincides in these respects with the American Law Insti-
tute' s Restatement of the Law of Contracts. It is not 
due process under the 14th Amendment to apply the law of 
Utah where it differs from the law of New York: since 
under principles of conflicts of laws, the contract was 
concluded in New York. The intention of the parties to a 
contract must be ascertained from what they have said in 
their written contract. Black v. United States 91 U.S. 
267, 23 L.F.d. 324. No written contract is to be found in 
the record except the one shown in Points TI, IV, v and 
VI of the Appellant's Brief to this Court. The obliqa-
tion of such a contract is constitutionally protected 
even aqainst hostile legislation. Chicaqo, Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U.S. 57, 
42 L.F.d. 948, 18 s.ct. 513. In this case the trial court 
in effect cancelled, or at least completely ~isreoarded, 
the only written contract between the oarties. That in 
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itself voilates due process. Atlantic Delaine Co. v. 
James , 9 4 U. S . 2 0 7 , 2 4 L. F:d . 112. 
Furthermore, reoardless of how the court views 
the issue of where the contract was formed, there can be 
no question that the defendants did not provide Valad 
with anywhere near sufficient information to build the 
heaters pursuant to their completely unstated expecta-
tions. In this reqard, the logic and information con-
tained in Valad's Reply Brief is inescapable, and cannot 
be refuted. All of the critical information that was 
necessary in order for Valad to build the heaters to meet 
~allory's unstated expectations was omitted from the 
material sent to Valad. Valad, of course, has no duty, 
leqal nor equitable, to construct heaters to conform to 
Mallory's and Brown's unstated expectations of perfor-
mance. Points I, II, and III of the Reply Brief clearly 
~emonstrate this principle. 
The court's failure to consider and rule on 
these critical issues was a qross oversight. 
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CONCLUSION 
Rased upon the foreqoinq points, defendant 
Vala<i respectfully implores the court to reconsider its 
decision and reverse the judgment on iurisdiction as to 
Valad. In the alternative, the measure of damaqes should 
be reduced to comport to the Uniform Commercial Code and 
with long established formulas. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of April, 
1980. 
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